

Post-Liberation Xenophobia in Southern Africa: The Case of the Influx of Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrants into Botswana, c.1995–2004

Wazha G. Morapedi

For the last two decades, Botswana has had a reputation as a 'country of immigration', based on the large-scale import of skilled expatriates from Africa, Asia, and the West. This policy has been accompanied by a general acceptance, and even openness, on the part of Botswana towards non-citizens. In the late 1990s, however, these attitudes began to change, with intolerance towards non-citizens growing in a country where it was unknown only a few years earlier. (Crush 2003:1-2)

The underlying reason for the growth in intolerance seems to be related to actual changes in immigration patterns in Botswana. The economic and political problems in Zimbabwe in particular have led to a significant increase in unauthorised migration to and through Botswana. The Botswana authorities have become considerably more active in arresting and deporting unauthorised migrants. Further adding to the visibility of the issue, the media and politicians have begun to identify the presence of 'illegal immigrants' as a problem. (*ibid*)

Historical Background

The neighbouring southern African states of Botswana and Zimbabwe share a long common and porous border which, as in other African countries, is a creation of the colonial order. Similarly, too, this border divided people belonging to the same cultural, ethnic and linguistic groups, notably the Kalanga and Babirwa. There are today more Ikalanga-speaking people in Zimbabwe than Botswana (Nyamupachitu 1989:2–10; Mabikwa 200:2; Sekgwama 1996:15–17). While Botswana became a British protectorate in the late nineteenth century, Zimbabwe became a settler colony. Botswana attained independence in 1966, but in Zimbabwe, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the minority-white settlers led to a protracted war of liberation, which culminated in independence in 1980. During the liberation war, many Zimbabweans crossed over to Botswana and other neighbouring countries as refugees. On the eve of independence, an estimated 20 000 Zimbabwean refugees were housed in Francistown, Selibe Phikwe and Dukwi (Dale 1993:172). Some Zimbabweans with relatives in Botswana simply

crossed the border and stayed with them during the war. Before independence, there were also some Batswana, especially from the north, north-east and eastern parts of the country, who worked in Zimbabwe, mainly in Bulawayo and on the farms, while many along the border relied on shops on the Zimbabwean side for foodstuffs such as mealie-meal and sugar (Mabikwa 2000:12–14).

The lack of scholarly attention to issues concerning relations between Botswana and Zimbabwe, with focus rather on relations between Botswana and South Africa due to the latter's position as a regional power, has been noted (Dale 1993:172). This neglect also applies to the relationship between the peoples of the two countries. On the relationship between the two countries prior to the liberation of Zimbabwe, Dale (1993:1) writes that Botswana pursued what he termed the policy of "railway diplomacy" with Southern Rhodesia because of her reliance on the Rhodesia Railways. Botswana's fragile economy did not permit her to apply the United Nations sanctions imposed on the white-minority regime for its noncompliance with United Nations resolutions. Botswana requested a waiver of the sanctions. Despite keeping economic links, however, the Botswana government refused to recognise it or establish diplomatic relations.

Botswana suffered from armed incursions from Rhodesia because of its support for the liberation movements and this prompted the formation of a national army, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in 1977. As already mentioned, many Zimbabweans found refuge in Botswana during the war, and there was a general feeling of sympathy and acceptance of the plight that the Zimbabweans found themselves in. At independence, many Zimbabwean refugees voluntarily returned home. Some Zimbabweans had found employment in Botswana during the war, but one year after independence there were only about 94 Zimbabwean refugees left in Botswana. However, this number jumped to 601 in the following year, and by 1985 the number had soared to 4181. This phenomenal increase was caused by the volatile political situation in Matebeleland (*ibid*: 172–3), discussed below.

With the attainment of independence, Zimbabwe became a member of the then Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) and established links with independent Africa. Botswana and post-liberation Zimbabwe maintained good relations, and from 1980 bilateral trade between the two countries accounted for almost 50 per cent of the total intra-SADCC trade, with 50 per cent of Zimbabwean exports absorbed by Botswana. This trade became a source of friction between the two countries in a trade war which saw Zimbabwe adopt protectionist policies from 1982, imposing quotas on textile and clothing from Botswana. Botswana viewed this move as an act of sabotage against her textile industry (Nyampachitu 1984:75–89). There were also a few minor border incidents in 1983 which were characterised by skirmishes between the two national armies. These minor occurrences, however, did not strain relations between the two countries (Dale 1993:72).

Xenophobia in Southern Africa

Xenophobia has been defined variously, but most definitions concur on its major characteristics. It has been described as “a deep fear and dislike for the unknown” and also as “the deep dislike of non-nationals based on fear of the unknown or anything perceived as different”. It involves “attitudes, prejudices and behaviours that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons on the perceptions that those persons are outsiders or foreign to the community, society or national identity” (Shindondola 2001:2–3; McDonald and Jacobs 2005:296).

In South Africa, xenophobia has been seen as anti-black where foreigners were concerned, and a not fear of foreigners as such. In Botswana, xenophobia is about deep-seated dislike and it is usually expressed through verbal and physical abuse (Shindondola 2001:3). Xenophobia in Botswana has also been expressed largely through the deep dislike of black foreigners. In Botswana also, xenophobic tendencies of the past few years tend to fit into the broader definition which contend that the phenomenon is both an attitude and a practice, and not really a fear of foreigners. Because of different contexts, the violent behaviour which has accompanied xenophobia in South Africa has not been highly visible in Botswana. In Africa, the term ‘racism’ has been applied mainly to white-black, colonial, and apartheid issues; as these recede, the discourse of xenophobia, a term which also covers nationalistic antagonisms, has become increasingly prominent. Scholars, especially those who have conducted research on xenophobia in South Africa, have explained it in terms of scapegoating, isolation, and biocultural difference. The scapegoating theory derives xenophobia from limited resources such as education, employment, healthcare and housing. Here, foreigners take the blame for all societal ills and frustrations; and particularly, with competition for scarce resources, in the areas of unemployment. The isolation hypothesis traces the cause of xenophobia to long-term isolation between nationals of one country and another, while the biocultural hypothesis locates the origins of xenophobia in different physical, biological and cultural traits of nationals and foreigners (Shindondola 2001:8).

Post-liberation xenophobia is not limited to Botswana and South Africa. It is prevalent to varying degrees in southern Africa. According to McDonald and Jacobs (2005), xenophobia is “distinctive and widespread” in the region. It manifests itself in the behaviour of governments, the media, and the general public. These scholars emphatically maintain that, “extensive quantitative and qualitative research since 1995 has shown that public opinion in southern Africa, with some important variations between countries, is deeply xenophobic” (*ibid*). Xenophobic attitudes in southern Africa are displayed by people of all major socioeconomic and demographic groups. We find them among blacks and whites, young and old, and the educated and uneducated. McDonald and Jacobs capture the general situation thus: “Southern Africans display an extraordinary consistency in their antagonism towards foreigners, particularly those from

other countries in Africa and especially those deemed to be illegal immigrants” (2005:300–1, 319–20).

In their survey of newspapers whose reportage carries xenophobic references in the region, McDonald and Jacobs (*ibid*) conclude, “The harshest anti-immigrant sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, the anti-foreign ‘troika’”. Citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe “are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries”, but negative attitudes towards foreigners are also prevalent and there have been calls to tighten immigration laws and implement stringent surveillance measures. It is interesting to note that the three countries, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are regarded as doing comparatively well economically compared to Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique. They thus attract relatively more immigrants, which may lead to xenophobic attitudes.

In this study, I shall locate xenophobia against Zimbabwean immigrants to Botswana within some of the hypotheses mentioned earlier. The paper will also situate Botswana in the context of xenophobia in some host countries of southern Africa. The recent spurt of xenophobia in Botswana can largely be explained as scapegoating with regard to the large numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana, and what I shall term the ‘soaring crime thesis’. Evidence of the past few years will be used to validate this idea. The isolation and biocultural theories noted by scholars in the case of South Africa do not fit Botswana because that country has always been in contact with the rest of Africa, providing sanctuary to those fleeing persecution and oppression, while South Africa remained isolated from 1913 with its segregationist and later apartheid laws.

McDonald and Jacobs (2005:301) have argued that:

Another important feature of xenophobia in the region is that in fact most residents have relatively little direct contact with people from other countries. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the region is not a result of regular, direct personal contact with foreigners but rather a product of (mis)information from secondary sources, friends and the media.

But the Botswana experience tends to differ. While countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa had experienced turmoil in the past, resulting in little contact with outsiders, Botswana has been a sanctuary for immigrants from other southern African countries even before its independence. After independence, it hosted many refugees, mostly Zimbabweans.

Factors Accounting for the Influx of Undocumented Zimbabweans into Botswana

Immigration is an international phenomenon, and factors that have facilitated the immigration of people in Europe, America, Asia and other parts of Africa are similar to those currently involved in the movement of Zimbabweans into Botswana. Some of these factors are economic – the movement of people from depressed economies to economically stronger regions with the hope of finding employment and better living conditions, while others involve flight from political and cultural persecution from countries of origin (Power 1989:16–26; Ballard 1986). There are also practical reasons for illegal crossings: to attend a funeral, visit a relative, and so on. The destination could be just on the other side, yet the official route may require a detour of hundreds of kilometres.¹

The number of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants in the country has been increasing over the past decade. Because the immigration is undocumented, it is impossible to produce precise figures of the people involved. The only available statistics are for those who are repatriated, and estimates of those entering the country daily or monthly. In 2000, Botswana officials stated that about 1000 illegal Zimbabwean immigrants were deported every month. By September 2001, close to 20 000 had been repatriated (Nyamnjoh 2002:768). In 2002 alone, 26 717 illegal Zimbabwean immigrants were deported from the country (<http://www.queensu.ca/samp/news.htm>). Although the exact numbers for those already in the country are not known, these records show that many illegal Zimbabwean immigrants entered the country. Although it is true that newspaper articles report uncritically, “reproducing problematic statistics and assumptions on cross-border migration” (McDonald and Jacobs 2005:300), the figures are disproportionately enormous for Botswana, a country with relatively inadequate infrastructure and a population of just under two million people.

Only a few years after liberation, Zimbabwe entered its current economic and political crisis. The situation has been attributed to the economic policies that independent Zimbabwe pursued, and the desire by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) to maintain political dominance at all costs. This started immediately after independence, when ZANU could not tolerate the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), leading to the latter's suppression. The situation worsened with the deployment of the notorious Korean-trained Fifth Brigade – the Gukurahundi in Matabeleland. This force unleashed a reign of terror on all people suspected of ZAPU sympathies, including Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres and those suspected of having crossed to Botswana during the liberation war. It is estimated that as many as 1250 people were killed, while many 'disappeared' (Ranger, McGregor and Alexander 2000:190–1). This terror led to the influx of refugees into Botswana.

The need to dominate the political landscape continued after the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Commenting on the beginning of the current political crisis in Zimbabwe, Raftopolous (2002) says that

ZANU–PF launched political violence after its defeat in the February 2000 referendum. Later that year, the MDC emerged with a stronger parliamentary representation in the general elections, and this provoked intervention by ZANU–PF. This reaction included violent occupation of land by war veterans with state backing, and massive deployment of terror and threats on Zimbabweans. During the elections, opposition supporters were subjected to violence which included murders, intimidation and harassment, resulting in the deaths of more than one hundred people. The violence also included brutal beatings and expulsions from schools and jobs (Scarnecchia 2006:222). All these produced ‘push’ factors for migration. Botswana, by contrast, being both stable and prosperous, had ‘pull’ factors.

Interviews carried out with documented and undocumented Zimbabweans reveal that the poor economic conditions in their country largely account for the influx of Zimbabweans into Botswana.² Zimbabwean nationals emphasised that there were no jobs in their country, and that the situation was disheartening because even the few available jobs offered low wages, while on the other hand the prices of basic commodities were skyrocketing (*Botswana Gazette*, August 4–10, 2003). These views are corroborated by Botswana’s chief immigration officer, who added that “Botswana’s strong economy is luring young Zimbabwean men and women who have few prospects of a job at home as their country slides deeper into crisis” (*Botswana Guardian*, August 2, 2003).

The economic ‘pull’ factor has been underlined by the Zimbabwean High Commissioner to Botswana, who opined that the “large” entry of undocumented Zimbabweans into Botswana was precipitated by the fact that they were ready to do jobs that Botswana shunned. According to the High Commissioner, Botswana had no interest in employment as domestic workers, farm hands and cattle herders, so Zimbabweans saw this as an opportunity to work in the country (*Botswana Gazette*, August 27, 2003). This assertion has some truth since in 2002, Botswana’s Minister of Labour and Home Affairs intimated that he intended asking his colleagues in government to consider issuing permits to foreigners to come into the country and take up the above-mentioned occupations, because Botswana were not prepared to do them. (In fact it could be that Botswana do not exactly shun these jobs, but they detest the exploitation and lack of protection that are inherent in them.)³

The economic malaise in Zimbabwe began in 1990 when she adopted her structural adjustment programme. By the late 1990s, the effects were largely catastrophic. The indications of decline included a fall of real wages from an index of 122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997, and the figure of households living in poverty increased from 61 per cent in 1995 to 75 per cent in 2000. There was a crisis in agricultural and food security with loss of employment due to a decline in commercial farming, and by mid-2000, 100 000 people had been affected by evictions and millions were short of food. In addition, broader economic trends were bleak (Phimister and Raftopolous 2004:358–73; Moore 2001:254–55).

Rising Xenophobic Tendencies in Botswana

Although there has always been awareness of the distinction between locals and foreigners in many societies, including Botswana, this has acquired high magnitudes in recent years and the notion of 'them' and 'us' has become more pronounced. The xenophobic or near-xenophobic attitudes of Botswana, especially towards Zimbabwean documented or undocumented immigrants, is becoming more apparent. This shift in attitudes is shown by the fact that, upon learning of a crime, especially housebreaking and theft, the most likely immediate response by many Botswana would be *E a bo e le ma-Zimbabwe* (It would be Zimbabweans). The existence of xenophobia in the country has been noted by the human rights body Ditshwanelo, which added this was in direct conflict with basic human rights enshrined in Botswana's constitution. According to Ditshwanelo (2000), xenophobia is one of the forces that are threatening the stability of the country and the southern African region.

Botswana have, in the past, pursued a policy of acceptance and openness towards non-citizens, but of late it appears there is a feeling that there are too many immigrants in the country and, in addition to the issue being more visible to the public, politicians and the media have "identified the presence of illegal immigrants as a problem" (Crush 2002:2). This perception by politicians and the media, two forces which are capable of capturing public attention, is likely to exacerbate xenophobic tendencies.

In order to explain the rising xenophobic tendencies towards Zimbabweans in Botswana, it is useful to review the general attitude towards non-citizens over the past few decades. Francis Nyamnjoh has candidly described and analysed these tendencies. After the discovery of diamonds in the 1970s, Botswana attracted many immigrants, especially those with skills. Nyamnjoh (2002:767) identifies four categories of foreigners in the country. These are: expatriates, mostly whites, who belong to the high-income-earning bracket; other whites who are, in most cases, British or South African mostly engaged in business; Asians, mostly of Chinese and Indian descent, also involved in business; and blacks from other African countries who are derogatively referred to as *makwerekwere*. These include both legal and illegal immigrants. Generally, in southern Africa, black Africans from other parts of Africa are the ones who suffer the xenophobia. The darker complexioned are worse off in terms of being subjected to prejudice. Immigrants from Europe, North America and Asia are also affected by xenophobia (McDonald and Jacobs 2005:300) but, it appears, less severely.

Nyamnjoh (2002:767-8) contends that the migrant positions of *makwerekwere* are "most vulnerable to question and revision by the locals, as compared to those of Asians or whites, in that order. And among *makwerekwere*, Zimbabweans are those whose presence is most contested and most devalued by locals". Zimbabweans are the ones who bear the brunt of national targeting and they are more likely to suffer from public prejudice, police harassment, stereotyping and debasement (McDonald and Jacobs 2005:318). This hardening and dislike of

Botswana towards Zimbabweans has not always been the case. There are reasons why Zimbabweans, especially undocumented immigrants, have recently been subjected to high levels of xenophobic treatment. In comparison with other Africans, Zimbabweans are regarded more as economic migrants who have entered Botswana to steal jobs and deprive Botswana "the right of enjoying the comfort of their wealth" (Nyamnjoh 2002:767–8). This would, to some extent, support the scapegoating hypothesis. Recently, Botswana has been experiencing high levels of both unemployment and poverty. The competition for scarce resources emerges as a contributory factor to xenophobia.

The more pronounced xenophobic attitudes towards fellow Africans are not confined to Botswana. In South Africa, studies have revealed that the situation has assumed gigantic proportions, even occasioning violence against the so-called illegal aliens (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 1998:4–5 and 123–31; Morris 1998:10–11). In a survey carried out by the *Botswana Guardian* on Africans living in countries such as the United States and Britain, where one was likely to suffer xenophobic treatment, the interviewees stressed that in South Africa there was a far more serious problem with black Africans, and that xenophobia was full-blown in that country (*Botswana Guardian*, August 22, 2003). While some of them cited Botswana as an ideal African country to live in, and there is also much cogency in the assertion that Botswana is "one of few countries where it is believed the traditional African hospitality is still alive and well" (*ibid*), this does not mean that xenophobic tendencies are not present there. They have been detected by researchers, officials and non-governmental organisations.

Although unemployment and the sense that Botswana have not benefited from national wealth have contributed to the intolerant attitudes towards foreigners, reinforcing the scapegoating theory, in recent years the mounting crime wave in the country has been critical. Politicians, local newspapers, the police and leaders of civic society have been issuing statements and writing headlines on crime and the role of Zimbabweans in it. Some made it sound as if a war was raging in the country and such reports may have contributed to growing hostilities towards Zimbabweans. The situation reached fever pitch in 2003 with violent incidents in the villages of the north-east and Tlokweng, a peri-urban centre east of Gaborone, that led to orders expelling Zimbabweans from these areas. In Masunga, the headquarters of the north-east district, there was a spate of nasty incidents such as the brutal battering of mostly elderly people who were robbed and left for dead, and numerous cases of rape, housebreaking and theft by what were suspected as Zimbabwean assailants. In one incident, an 85-year-old man was viciously beaten, robbed and left for dead. The assailants were reported to have spoken a Zimbabwean language (*The Voice*, August 15, 2003). Some residents have been attacked and robbed in broad daylight.

The district has become one of the flashpoints of xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans. This reached a climax when infuriated residents of Masunga convened a series of *kgotla* (village assembly) meetings where, in one of them,

Zimbabweans *whether documented or undocumented* were ordered to leave the village immediately. Villagers, the police and other officials held Zimbabweans accountable for the rising crime wave in the area (*The Voice*, July 11, 2003). The police station commander at Masunga observed that, “illegal” Zimbabwean immigrants committed crime, and he listed the latest as one rape, one attempted rape, 10 cases of housebreaking and theft, one case of killing, two stock-theft cases, three robbery cases, and one case of stealing a bicycle. His report was followed by that of the hospital matron, who informed the *kgotla* that Zimbabwean immigrants had cut the hospital fence and stolen valuable property including medication for anti-retroviral therapy, and that the hospital mortuary was congested with corpses of foreigners, mostly illegal Zimbabwean immigrants (*Botswana Daily News*, August 23, 2003).

Although complaints and allegations of theft by Zimbabweans have been happening in the district for some time, such actions by the residents, some of whom have harboured and employed Zimbabweans, mark a turning point in their attitudes. They have long had a close affinity with Zimbabweans, and the villagers’ uncompromising stance is largely attributable to rising crime including the slaughtering of domestic animals such as goats and sheep for food.⁴ The north-east has probably experienced the highest number of undocumented Zimbabweans compared to other districts because of its proximity to Zimbabwe and its historical connection with that country. With the worsening economic situation in Zimbabwe, the district has witnessed a phenomenal increase in cases of housebreaking, the theft and slaughter of domestic animals, assaults and robbery. In these cases, the majority of those arrested were indeed undocumented Zimbabweans, and they cite hunger as a reason for committing crimes.⁵

Police reports from various parts of the north-eastern and eastern Botswana have attributed the high rate of crime in the country to Zimbabwean immigrants. In July 2003, the Botswana police divisional commander for the South Central stated that most of the crimes committed in the villages of Maunatlala, Mochudi, Mahalapye and the city of Gaborone were carried out by Zimbabweans, although some Botswana were also involved (*Mmegi*, July 23–31, 2003). These areas lie along the railway line, where Botswana’s major villages and towns are located. These are the relatively developed centres with infrastructure where immigrants (as well as people from more remote areas seeking work) naturally congregate. They are the ones that seem to have witnessed increased numbers of Zimbabwean undocumented immigrants. Unemployment in these areas translates into unfulfilled expectations and frustration. This has fuelled xenophobia as unemployment has been blamed on Zimbabwean immigrants who, in some instances, provide cheap labour especially in the unskilled and semi-skilled sectors.

The mounting xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans also came to the fore in Tlokweneng, where the Masunga incident was repeated. After a series of crimes, including housebreaking and theft, robbery, rapes and assaults, a *kgotla* was convened to discuss the situation. Tempers flared at the meeting, with villagers

ordering all Zimbabweans and visitors to leave the village in peace. The Batlokwa deputy chief captured the mood and concerns of the residents when he noted, “We can no longer travel freely at night, our kids cannot go to school and we cannot even send them on errands because they fear Zimbabweans”. This onslaught on Zimbabweans arose from the concern among residents, the police and tribal officials that Zimbabweans were mainly responsible for increasing violent crimes in the village such as breaking into houses, attacking their owners, robbing and assaulting them (*Mmegi*, August 8–14, 2003).

As with residents of Masunga, Batlokwa made no distinction between documented and undocumented Zimbabweans. The deputy chief was adamant in apportioning blame and ordering all Zimbabweans to leave. He lamented that “crime in the village has gone up because of these people-rapes, assaults and break-ins into houses have increased dramatically”, and “we have arrived at a time when we say: enough is enough. We cannot take it anymore. We therefore agreed that Zimbabweans should leave the village in peace”. The chief added that at least 10 criminal cases involving Zimbabweans are brought before his *kgotla* daily. The local police station commander concurred with the chief, and added that Zimbabweans committed most crimes in Tlokwen (*Botswana Gazette*, August 13, 2003). The two incidents signify xenophobia because in addition to deep signs of dislike for Zimbabweans, they constitute a practice – the expulsion. These indiscriminate mass expulsions were in contravention of Article 12 sections 4 and 5 of the African Union Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which prohibit the mass expulsion of non-nationals directed at ethnic, national or religious groups. Section 4 also stipulates that non-nationals legally admitted in a country may only be expelled from that country by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law. Some of the Zimbabweans ‘expelled’ from the villages did not commit any crime, nor were they judged to have done so by law, but were expelled simply because they were Zimbabweans.

The classification of all Zimbabweans as criminals has the potential to heighten xenophobic treatment against them. Most Zimbabwean immigrants have lived in Botswana as law-abiding people simply seeking to earn a living – including undocumented Zimbabweans, most of whom are law-abiding except in their immigration status. Some have made immense contributions in various spheres of Botswana’s development efforts. This pattern is known from South Africa, where linking of all immigrants with criminal activities has exacerbated xenophobia (HRW 1998:123–4). Croucher (1998:10) observes that the labelling of immigrants in South Africa as criminals by police and public officials crystallises the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In several instances in Botswana, as cases above indicate, the police and other officials have made this labelling and this is likely to have a similar effect of legitimating xenophobia among the general citizenry.

The xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans in Botswana can also be attributed to the growing economic and social problems bedeviling the country. Although it

has been hailed as an African success story, in 2003 unemployment was reportedly running at about 19 per cent (*Mmegi Monitor*, October 5, 2003), and every year more than 20 000 secondary school-leavers have faced an uncertain future because they could not find jobs (*ibid*). Batswana do not want to perform certain jobs because of the poor wages; by accepting these low-paying jobs, Zimbabweans are perceived to be responsible for unemployment and deprivation. One is bound to concur with Nyamnjoh (2002:763) that Batswana have become “extra critical about entitlements to citizenship and the advantages or privileges that come with it because economic opportunities are uncertain”. Because Batswana perceive that they are entitled to economic benefits and other opportunities that exist in their country, the fact that they do not enjoy these has fuelled the negative attitudes towards Zimbabweans. To some extent, there is competition for jobs in the informal sector between Batswana and Zimbabweans, and this could explain xenophobic tendencies in that sector. Some street vendors from various places in Gaborone have complained that Zimbabweans dominate the street-vending business. Saloon owners from various parts of the city have also lodged complaints and reported Zimbabweans “who plait hair in the streets and houses and stifle their business” (*Botswana Guardian*, August 8, 2003).

The soaring crime rate has also been matched by large numbers of Zimbabwean immigrants in Botswana. As indicated, the numbers of these immigrants was already high in the years 2001 to 2003. They have continued to rise in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. In 2004, 58 808 immigrants were repatriated at a cost of P387.900 (US\$59.659.02), while in 2005, 56 117 were repatriated at a cost of P339.915 (US\$52.278.92). These figures do not provide a true reflection of the actual numbers in the country because they were only the ones that the police were able to identify, while many more were not detected (*Botswana Guardian*, November 17, 2006). In the city of Francistown alone, there were about 28 120 Zimbabwean ‘illegal’ immigrants out of a population of 83 000 in 2005. This translated into 33.88 per cent of the population (*Mmegi*, March 17, 2006). From 2005, the plight of desperate Zimbabweans and their subsequent exodus to neighbouring countries was worsened by Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order). The Zimbabwe government launched this now infamous exercise in early 2005 whose main feature was the demolition of supposedly illegal structures in urban centres (Kamete 2006:271). Hundreds of thousands of people were harmed by these demolitions, with the United Nations Habitat envoy estimating that about 700 000 people lost either the basis of their livelihoods or their homes or both. The total estimate of those directly or indirectly affected was put at 2.4 million people. The demolitions had multiple negative effects such as loss of incomes, weakening food security and severely compromising people’s health. Multitudes were forced to live by the roads or flee to churches, and more were forced into the diaspora (Tibajuka 2005; Potts 2006:276–80). Evidence gathered by the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition indicate that many Zimbabweans affected by the operation fled to neighbouring countries, including Botswana. The majority of Zimbabwean immigrants have been the poor, destitute and desperate people who

fled economic hardships in Zimbabwe. These were not the skilled nurses, doctors and technicians highly needed by Botswana's economy. The immigrants were bound to impose strains on the country's small economy with its inadequate infrastructure and facilities. Also, most of the immigrants were found in the poor and depressed suburbs of Botswana's towns and in the rural areas. This scenario has also exacerbated xenophobia in the country.

In many countries, the media has a crucial role to play because it informs the public. The manner in which such information is relayed is critical because it can influence and shape public opinion. In Botswana, the issue of immigrants, especially undocumented Zimbabweans, has been accorded extensive coverage by the media. While some reports have been cautious in their approach, others have been less measured, at times sounding alarmist and sensational. Although some of the incidents covered by the press, such as the battering and rape of women in the north-east, were indeed brutal and bloody, other reports have created an image of a country under siege. Headlines such as "White City Reels under Zimbabwean Invasion", "Botswana Swamped by Illegal Immigrants", and "Zimbabwean Citizens Causing Havoc" are alarmist. Some reports and headlines generalise the issue and make it appear that Zimbabweans were inevitably involved. Such coverage is bound to create negative opinions about Zimbabweans and harden readers' attitudes. A survey of press reporting of migration in southern Africa showed that Botswana came second to South Africa in terms of articles with negative references and sensational headlines. Botswana appeared to top the list of articles that used negative metaphors for immigrants such as 'floods', 'hordes', and 'waves'. On average, newspapers in Botswana produced the most xenophobic articles of the three countries surveyed (Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia). A total of 192 articles were analysed and most of them were anti-immigrant and unanalytical. Most news items in Botswana were "largely superficial, repeated the worst stereotypes of refugees and migrants and blamed immigrants for crime and for unfair competition on the scarce job market" (McDonald and Jacobs 2005:316). In their meetings with the public, politicians, the police and tribal leaders have also made generalised references to Zimbabweans.

Zimbabwean undocumented immigrants have become scapegoats for some of the socioeconomic ills that are bedevilling the country. This perception has been presented graphically by the *Botswana Guardian* (August 8, 2003). The newspaper asserted that Zimbabweans

are blamed for the foot-and-mouth disease that resulted in the slaughter of cattle in the north-east district. They are blamed for growing crime rates, overcrowding in local prisons and even the HIV/AIDS pandemic. They are blamed for everything that ails Botswana.

During meetings addressed by the president in Francistown, officials accused Zimbabweans of engaging in crime and prostitution, and at another meeting the

member of parliament for the north-east blamed them for the outbreak of foot-and-mouth and the difficulty in containing its spread (*Mmegi*, June 20–6, 2003). In South Africa too, a similar situation has been noted whereby foreigners have become a scapegoat for the country's ills. There Congolese, Nigerian, Mozambican and Zimbabwean immigrants have been blamed for the spread of diseases, high crime rate and unemployment. They have become scapegoats in inflammatory speeches which only serve to intensify xenophobic sentiments (Klaaren and Ramji 2002:116; Morris 2003:10–1). The Inkatha Freedom Party has threatened to take action if the government does not solve the problem of unemployment by dealing sternly with immigrants, and the now defunct New National Party accused immigrants of stealing jobs from South Africans, as well as spreading diseases and exacerbating poverty (Shindondola 2001:12).

Official Reaction to Xenophobia and the Influx of Immigrants

The government of Botswana, local authorities such as *dikgosi* (chiefs), members of parliament, and law enforcement agencies have reacted to the influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants, the problems they are reportedly causing, and xenophobia in various ways. As indicated, the Botswana police has linked Zimbabweans to the mounting crime rate in the country. Police reports from various centres in the country, especially in the east and north-eastern parts have indicated that most criminal cases involving housebreaking and theft, armed robberies, and common theft are committed by Zimbabwean immigrants. In most of their reports, no distinction was made on whether the culprits were documented or undocumented Zimbabweans (*Mmegi*, July 25–31, 2003).

Police and immigration officials have also highlighted the burdensome nature of undocumented immigrants, noting that their resources could not cope with the influx. They have lamented the fact that the volume of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants entering the country in search of jobs “created an unwelcome burden for the country's law enforcement agencies”. According to the commissioner of police, illegal immigrants “outstretch our facilities and resources because illegal immigrants, once apprehended, have to be placed in temporary shelters like detention centres and prisons”. The police do not have sufficient manpower to deal with this ‘problem’. The commissioner's counterpart, the chief immigration officer, emphasised the huge cost the government incurs in repatriating undocumented immigrants. The government spends, on average, about P50.00 (Z\$8,240.00 and US\$7.69) on a single immigrant to cover transportation, meal expenses and subsistence allowance for repatriating officers (*Botswana Guardian*, August 22, 2003). The costs of undocumented immigrants have similarly been emphasised on numerous occasions by authorities in South Africa, and it has been argued that this has exacerbated xenophobic sentiments (Peberdy 2001:15–24). By emphasising the costs, citizens are bound to conclude that resources are diverted from addressing their social and economic needs to immigrants and hence feel aggrieved towards the latter, with the likelihood of conflict

and violence, all of which creates a climate that is detrimental to the welfare and human rights of immigrants. The practice of placing Zimbabwean 'illegal' immigrants in prisons and temporary detention centres such as the one at Francistown shows a continuation of earlier government policy on refugees during the liberation war. Then, the status of Zimbabwean refugees was regarded as temporary, waiting to transit to a third country or until the war ended; thus they were placed in 'reception centres' at Francistown and Selibe Phikwe (Southall 1984:167).

In a bid to control the inflow of illegal immigrants into the country, the Botswana police have also intensified stop-and-search operations in major villages, arresting undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants and seizing an assortment of weapons such as knives and picks (*Botswana Daily News*, August 8, 2003). In conjunction with the paramilitary special support group (SSG), immigration officials and the army, the police conduct border patrols and mount urban sweeps to 'sniff' out undocumented immigrants. However, these sweeps, patrols, and stop-and-search tactics have been followed by claims from immigrants that they have been subjected to brutal treatment such as beatings. Most of the allegations levelled at the SSG are that, on rounding up *makwerekwere*, the authorities applied brutal harassment and torture methods to deter immigrants from returning once repatriated (*Botswana Guardian*, October 13, 2002). In South Africa too, undocumented immigrants have talked about their harrowing experiences at the hands of the police and the Department of Home Affairs (HRW 1998:4,5,39 and 123-4). Police in Botswana have continually denied these allegations. The use of these methods and tactics, if true, would imply a violation of human rights enshrined in the constitution of Botswana. A positive measure by the law enforcement agencies is the holding of regular meetings with their Zimbabwean counterparts to address the issue of undocumented immigrants entering Botswana. However, the co-operation could only bear fruit if the two parties were to seek meaningful and humane solutions which did not entail the infringement of basic rights.

The official position of the government of Botswana, or at least its informal reaction to the influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants and the resultant xenophobia, has been that the country's laws ought to be observed. The highest office in the land has cautioned Botswana against taking the law into their own hands. The President and some cabinet ministers, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, have called for understanding and appreciation of the plight that the people of Zimbabwe find themselves in. Amid calls for sterner measures against undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants from residents during *kgotla* meetings, some members of parliament and *dikgosi*, President Mogae and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have persistently warned Botswana to refrain from xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans and called for a respect of the law and human rights. After what the media reported as the 'eruption' of tensions between Botswana and illegal immigrants who were accused of the upsurge in murders, rape cases, and theft, and the disadvantaging of locals on job opportunities, Mogae promised to "get tough" with those foreigners involved in smuggling. He noted that sealing

the country's borders was not a solution, but that appropriate and humanely deterrent measures were needed against undesirable behaviour. The President reiterated that Botswana's small economy could not afford the large numbers of immigrants, but the country would accept and settle the immigrants, while liberalising its immigration laws to encourage some legal immigration (*Mmegi*, November 10–16, 2000). This was an accommodative statement by the head of state which sought humane solutions to the issue of immigration.

Following a series of disturbing allegations by the *Zimbabwe Chronicle* about the human rights abuses meted out to Zimbabwe immigrants in Botswana, Mogae visited Zimbabwe in October 2002 for bilateral talks which focused on the alleged brutalities. These stories had the potential to sour relations between the two countries (*Mmegi*, October 18–24, 2002). The visit showed the will to solve potential conflicts at the highest policy level, and hence avert conflict which can create political divisions in Africa and impede efforts towards revitalising the region's economic development. This was a major stride in achieving the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the African Union which calls for the promotion of sustainable development of the economic, social and cultural levels of African countries, as well as the integration of their economies.

At a *kgotla* addressed by President Mogae in Francistown, his audience appealed to him to contact his Zimbabwean counterpart on the issue of undocumented immigrants because the situation was unbearable. Although he conceded that the government incurs heavy costs in repatriating undocumented immigrants and keeping lawbreakers in jail, Mogae stressed that people should follow the law in addressing this issue (*Midweek Sun*, July 9, 2003). At another meeting, he informed his listeners that Zimbabweans were driven from their country by their economic plight. He stated his position thus: "The plight they [Zimbabweans] find themselves in forces them to be involved in criminal activities. But we have to take them through our justice system as we are also not immune to prosecution" (*Mmegi*, July 17–25, 2003). Thus, the President once more adopted a non-confrontational approach, one which calls for understanding, tolerance and adherence to the rule of law – principles essential for the realisation of ideals of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. This position echoes the earlier policy on refugees when Botswana offered freedom to exiled Zimbabweans fleeing persecution (Southall 1984:174). Although illegal immigrants face deportation when found, the emphasis on the protection of human rights and the plight of Zimbabweans is, in a way, a continuation of the pre-independence Botswana policy on refugees.

Indeed, President Mogae has emphasised the need for good relations between southern African countries as a prerequisite for development. In reacting to the border dispute between Botswana and Zimbabwe, which has delayed construction of a bridge on the Chobe River to link the states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the President optimistically stressed that the dispute would be solved amicably because the two were sister states and the

bridge is meant to benefit the entire SADC region (*Botswana Guardian*, June 20, 2003). The need for SADC countries to co-operate has been well articulated by Tsie (1989:230–4) when he relates that co-operation will enable SADC states to enlarge their small domestic markets. Through co-operation, these states would be able to make a united stand against outside aid agencies and governments, and bargain from a strong position. The countries can also coordinate and plan development programmes and avoid unnecessarily duplicating their efforts.

The African continent can only achieve its intended objectives if African leaders make a firm commitment to fighting the obstacles and threats that impede regional and continental development. Some of these shortcomings have been identified by the African National Congress, which holds that fighting xenophobia in southern Africa (one of these obstacles) entails support for the regional integration of SADC countries. The realisation of these objectives may be made impossible by the misperceptions, animosities and divisions that could emerge among Africans (*ANC Today*, 2001:2). The more positive views of the ANC, together with those of President Mogae, are important for regional integration, which is one of the fundamental strategies through which southern African countries can bolster their economic strength and claim their stake among other powerful continental blocs.

The incumbent minister has been at the forefront in spelling out government's position on the influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants and the xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans. The issue of foreigners in Botswana cropped up in the parliamentary budget debate in March 2001. Some members of parliament used explosive language to lambast foreigners who, they argued, have abused Botswana's hospitality and exploited nationals. However, it seems that the onslaught here was directed at foreign investors and those considered to be in 'comfortable' positions and enjoying the fruits of the country. One member went to the extent of urging a 'clean-up campaign' to be conducted on these foreigners. The Foreign Affairs Minister accused "unscrupulous" individuals of abusing the hospitality of the country, but cautioned his fellow legislators not to "tar all foreigners with the same brush". Emphasising the positive aspect of the presence of the majority of foreigners in the country, the minister said "The overwhelming majority of foreign nationals who live and work in this country are highly committed and are making a contribution to our national life in terms economic, technical, social and even cultural development" (*Botswana Guardian*, March 20, 2001). Minister Merafhe warned parliamentarians against intolerance, adding that "xenophobia should have no place in our nation. Our tolerance and hospitality has long captured the world's imagination and we are proud of this record and we shall do everything we can to uphold it" (*ibid*).

Reacting to the expulsion of Zimbabweans from the villages of Masunga and Tlokweg in 2003, the Foreign Affairs Minister stated that the issue was "very sensitive". He maintained that *dikgosi* had undertaken these measures because they were unhappy, and called upon Zimbabweans to police themselves and re-

port thieves to the police because this action might “temper the ill-feeling that Batswana had towards Zimbabweans”. The minister promised that he would meet the Zimbabwean High Commissioner to discuss this issue, calling on Batswana to desist from xenophobic treatment of Zimbabweans (*Botswana Gazette*, August 13, 2003). In her reaction to the incidents of Masunga and Tlokweg, another member of cabinet, the then Minister of Health, expressed concern at the actions taken by *dikgosi*, maintaining that “this will sour our relations with Zimbabwe much more”. She wondered whether there was any proof that most of the criminal activities were indeed committed by Zimbabweans, and called upon tribal authorities and politicians to discuss these issues because of their “sensitivity” (*Botswana Gazette*, August 13, 2003). Her colleague, the Minister of Lands and Housing, who was also member of parliament for Gaborone central where White City (nicknamed Harare for its many Zimbabwean visitors) is located, was also cautious in dealing with the immigrant issue. Responding to her White City constituents’ castigation of Zimbabwean undocumented immigrants as criminals, she countered that even young Batswana commit crimes under peer pressure. The minister blamed her electorate for being partly responsible for the rising crime rate in the area because they have turned their houses into lodges where they accommodate the immigrants (*Mmegi Monitor*, July 7–13, 2003).

Xenophobic situations can build up tensions between countries and lead to conflict. The official position calls for the diffusion of tensions likely to cause conflict with potentially disastrous consequences for the two countries and the region at large. The revival and renewal of Africa calls for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the rule of law, and close co-operation between African countries for the realisation of good for the peoples of the continent. The Botswanan official stance is, hence, a commendable development in line with promoting some well-cherished principles necessary for the African continent in the twenty-first century.

However, even at ministerial level, there have been some dissenting voices. In 2000 a statement by the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs smacked of xenophobia, emphasising the heavy costs incurred by the government because of immigrants, and the disempowerment of Batswana, in addition to a litany of other negatives associated with immigrants. He appealed to Batswana to combat the ‘unhealthy’ influx of illegal immigrants, who deprived locals of their benefits. According to the minister, immigrants were prone to crime. He listed the ‘sins’ of the immigrants thus:

The price of hosting the influx of Zimbabwean economic refugees is no doubt too high to pay as it comes in the form of rising imported crime that manifests itself in robberies, illegal working and trading, border jumping, prostitution, overcrowding, forging of work and residents permits, you name it. (Nyamnjoh 2002:768)

In fact, some leading personalities such as members of parliament, members of the house of chiefs, and top immigration officials have been quoted making xenophobic remarks (*ibid*). The position taken by the minister in Botswana in this instance typifies that of the former hard-line South African Home Affairs Minister Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and some South African parliamentarians on the issue of undocumented immigrants. The minister had on numerous occasions emphasised the interests of South Africans first, and the need to use scarce resources for their benefit. He has also reminded his audience about the “enormous” costs of immigrants to the South African taxpayers (HRW 1998:123–6). This kind of discourse by national leaders has the potential to fuel xenophobia, which is reportedly rife in South Africa. The statements by Botswana’s minister highlights exclusivity, emphasising the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and makes Zimbabweans the scapegoats of the country’s social and economic ills; it is confrontational in its appeal. Nonetheless, to be fair, it has been rare for such statements to emerge from such high quarters in Botswana.

As well as those who constitute the top echelons of power in Botswana, other leaders and stakeholders have also made their position clear. Following the debate on foreigners in parliament in 2001, the issue came before the house of chiefs. Only two among the 15 members made a measured response. They criticised some parliamentarians for the explosive language on foreigners. Other chiefs did not debate or were, like some members of parliament, hostile to non-citizens.⁶ One member of the house condemned the lumping of foreigners under the same roof and said these outbursts were improper, especially as they were made in parliament, while the other warned Botswana against xenophobia as they may be subjected to a similar fate in future (*Midweek Sun*, July 6, 2001).

Tribal leaders and Botswana in general have discussed the issue of the influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants and suggested solutions. Some of the responses and views have had xenophobic overtones. In Tlokweng, tribal leaders maintained that they were ready to send out a *mophato* (regiment) to “flush out Zimbabweans from the village”, and the deputy chief expressed his dismay at government’s inaction on this issue. Some elders called for a declaration of a state of emergency (*Botswana Gazette*, August 13, 2003). In both the Tlokweng and Masunga incidents, Zimbabweans were ordered to leave, irrespective of whether they were documented or undocumented immigrants. In Masunga, a vigilante group known as the Zimbabwe Clean-up Campaign was formed to “hunt” and “capture illegal immigrants” and hand them over to the *kgotla*. Similar search parties were set up in neighbouring villages (*The Voice*, July 11, 2003). Some of the vigilante groups resorted to extra-judicial measures in dealing with their ‘captives’.⁷

Other Botswana have been more accommodating. At a meeting called by the White City area member of parliament in 2003, residents differed on how to solve the problem of illegal immigrants. Whereas some embraced the hard-line position outlined above, others complained about the problems caused by

Zimbabweans, but urged for their humane treatment because they were "our neighbours" (*Botswana Gazette*, June 4–10, 2003). Tribal authorities and their subjects at Masunga and Tlokweng have also requested the revival of the traditional system of introducing visitors to the chief before they could stay in the village (*Mmegi*, August 8–14, 2003). While this could prove problematic in large population centres, it is a welcome move resuscitating traditional African protocol procedures which have nourished society in the past.

On the whole, there have been few reported incidents of violence meted out against undocumented Zimbabweans immigrants in Botswana. Although residents in the north-east were reportedly beginning to take the law into their own hands, it would appear that there have only been a few, relatively minor, incidents. In one case, for instance, two Botswana men were reported to be in police custody accused of assaulting four Zimbabweans suspected of stealing a goat at Kgari village (*Botswana Daily News*, July 28, 2003). In July 2003, it was reported that from Jackalas No 2 village, 17 people including a local policeman were facing murder charges after killing a Zimbabwean man suspected of being a thief (*Botswana Guardian*, July 18, 2003). These, together with several minor skirmishes at the Gaborone and Francistown bus ranks between Botswana and Zimbabweans over allegations of theft by the latter,⁸ have been minor occurrences compared to the organised and intense violence that immigrants have been subjected to in South Africa. There, in the city of Johannesburg in 1994 and 1995, Zimbabweans, Malawians and Mozambicans were subjected to weeks of violence in a bid to 'clean up' townships of foreigners, especially hawkers, with organised groups such as Buyelakhaya (Go back home) leading the campaign. Immigrants were also assaulted in the streets with people shouting "*Phansi makwerekwere*" (Down with *makwerekwere*) (HRW 1998:135). This xenophobic treatment and violence have not reached such magnitude in Botswana. However, there is potential for such a situation developing if the authorities from Botswana and Zimbabwe do not establish mutually acceptable solutions. As Louw (2003:3,9) observes, sources of conflict between two countries could lead to instability in the region, and such instability has the tendency to overspill. Conflict could deter foreign investments and curtail efforts towards regional regeneration and revitalisation.

Conclusion

The issue of undocumented immigration is one of the major challenges facing the southern African region. Xenophobic tendencies are now well rooted in some countries of the region, notably in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. In some quarters in Botswana, the influx of Zimbabwean immigrants has been regarded as a 'crisis' and this could harden attitudes towards Zimbabweans. The influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants has coincided with a rising crime wave in the country. Law enforcement agents, some politicians, tribal leaders, the media and some Botswana in general have associated Zimbabweans with the rise in

crime, and this has contributed to negative attitudes towards Zimbabweans and in some instances to xenophobic treatment of the latter. The generalisation that Zimbabweans are involved in most crimes can exacerbate xenophobia and lead to human rights abuses. This has the potential to damage relations between Botswana and Zimbabwe, and hamper efforts towards regional integration. The southern African region and Africa at large can avoid being marginalised by globalisation through avoiding conflict, and maintaining peace and stability, good governance and economic development. Through these, they can realise their objectives of continental regeneration and renewal.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to Dr Bruce Bennett who read an earlier version of this paper and made valuable comments. The useful comments and suggestions provided by the anonymous referees are also gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1. Interview with Colia Nyondo, Mulambakwena, Botswana, July 20, 2003.
2. Interviews with numerous documented and undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants, Mulambakwena, Francistown and Gaborone, Botswana, July and September, 2003.
3. Alice Mogwe of Ditshwarelo, the Botswanan human rights body, did not agree with the minister's view that Botswana shun these jobs. She said that she did not know of any studies that support such a supposition. Instead, she argued that Botswana were not willing to take up manual jobs because manual workers were not protected by the laws of the country. There was no minimum wage, workers worked for long hours, and they were exploited. She gave an example of one farm where manual workers were paid P135.00 (US\$20.76) a month, a 50kg bag of mealie-meal, a 2kg packet of sugar and 500g of Tanganda tea. Mogwe suggested, that if non-citizen workers were to be brought in, they should be protected.
4. Interview with Nelson Chaboneka, Mulambakwena, Botswana, July 21, 2003.
5. Interview with three Botswana police officers, Masunga, Botswana, July 13, 2003.
6. One member of the house of chiefs retorted that disliking foreigners was a sign that Botswana had healthy minds, while another lashed out, "It's a fact that for the past 30 years, foreigners have grown fat on the sweat of Botswana whom they exploit".
7. Interview with two residents of Mulambakwena village involved in the search parties, September 26, 2003. They said that they usually subjected any 'captured' Zimbabwean to some beatings and rough treatment before handing them to the police or the *kgotla*. This was done in order to deter Zimbabweans from returning to Botswana after deportation.
8. Interview with Borakanelo police station commander, Gaborone, August 25, 2003.

References

- African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights. Accessed at http://www.africa-union.org/officials_documents/Treaties_Conventions_Protocols/Banjul_Charter.pdf.
- Alexander, J., Ranger T. and McGregor, J. 2000. *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Botswana Consultative Meeting on the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. 2000. Draft declaration, January 8–12.
- Croucher, S. 2002. "South Africa's Illegal Aliens: Constructing National Boundaries: A Post-Apartheid State", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 98,21:639–60.

- Crush, J. 1996. "A Bad Neighbour Policy? Migrant Labour and the New South Africa", *Southern African Report*, 12:3–5.
- _____. 2003. "Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Botswana". Policy Series No. 28. Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). [http://www.queensu.ca/samp/publications/policy series/policy28.htm](http://www.queensu.ca/samp/publications/policy%20series/policy28.htm).
- Crush, J. and McDonald D. 2000. "Transnationalism, African Immigration and New Migrant Spaces in South Africa: An Introduction", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 34,1:1–19.
- _____. 2001, "Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid", *Africa Today*, 48,3:1–13.
- Dale, R. 1993. "Botswana as a Hostage to High Politics? Twentieth-Century Conflict with South Africa and Zimbabwe". In Stedman, J. *Botswana and the Political Economy of Democratic Development*. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner: 163–84.
- Danso, R. and McDonald, D. 2001. "Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Print Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa", *Africa Today*, 48,3:115–38.
- Ditshwanelo (The Botswana Centre for Human Rights). 2001. Press Statement on International Human Rights Day.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1998. "'Prohibited Persons': Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in South Africa". New York: HRW.
- Hwedie, O. 1998. "The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa since 1966". In Lekorwe, M. and Edge, W. (eds). *Botswana: Society and Politics*. Pretoria: Van Schaik: 345–55.
- Kamete, A. 2006. "The Return of the Jettisoned: ZANU-PF's Crack at 'Re-Urbanising in Harare'", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32,2:255–72.
- Klaaren, J. and Ramji, J. 2001. "Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South Africa after Apartheid", *Africa Today*, 48,3:35–48.
- Louw, A. 2003. "The Concept of the African Renaissance as a Force Multiplier to Ensure Lasting Peace and Stability in sub-Saharan Africa". <http://www.mil.za/c sandf/CJsuppl/>.
- Mabikwa, K. 2000. "Impact of the Zimbabwe Liberation War on the Border People: A Case Study of the North East District, 1970–1980". Unpublished BA History research project. University of Botswana.
- Morris, A. 2003. "Our Fellow Africans Make Our Lives Hell: The Lives of Congolese and Nigerians Living in Johannesburg". <http://web11.epnet.com/citation.asp>.
- McDonald, D. and Jacobs, S. 2005. "(Re)writing Xenophobia: Understanding Press Coverage of Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 23,3:295–325.
- Moore, D. 2001. "Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land? Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19,2:253–66.
- Musemwa, M. 2006. "Disciplining a 'Dissident City': Hydropolitics in the City of Bulawayo, Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, 1980–1994", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32,2:239–54.
- Mwaangi, O. 2003. "Pan-Africanism and the Seeds of Destruction: The Role of Post-Liberation Xenophobia in South Africa". Paper presented at CODESRIA's 30th Anniversary, October 18–19, Gaborone, Botswana.

Nyamupachitu, J. 1989. "The Bechuanaland Protectorate–Southern Rhodesia International Border: Its Impact on the Partitioned Ikalanga-Speaking Society, 1890–1966". Unpublished BA Dissertation, University of Botswana.

Nyamupachitu, J. 1994. "Botswana–Zimbabwe Trade: Co-operation and Conflict in Bilateral Trade Relations, 1956–1993". Unpublished MA Dissertation, University of Botswana.

Perbedy, S. 2001. "Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South Africa", *Africa Today*, 48,3:15–34.

Phimister, I. and Raftopolous, B. 2004. "Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion", *Historical Materialism*, 12,4:355–82.

Potts, D. 2006. "'Restoring Order?' Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32,2:273–91.

Raftopolous, B. 2002. "Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 Presidential Election", *African Affairs*, 101, 404:413–26.

Scarnecchia, T. 2006. "The Fascist Cycle in Zimbabwe, 2000–2005", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32,2:221–37.

Sekgwama, J. 1996. "Aspects of the Socio-Economic and Political History of Babirwa, 1895–1975". Unpublished MA Dissertation, University of Botswana.

Shindondola, H. 2002. "Xenophobia in South Africa: The Voices of International Students". Paper presented to the Department of Sociology, Rand Afrikaans University.

Southall, R. 1984. "Botswana as a Host Country for Refugees", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, XXII,2:151–79.

Tibaijuka, A. 2005. "Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe". Accessed at <http://www.Kubatana.net/html/archive/urbdev/05718un.asp?>

Tsie, B. 1989. "Industrialisation Policy and Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: The Case of Botswana". Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Leeds University.

"Xenophobia and Intolerance Towards Fellow Africans Must be Tackled", *ANC Today*, 1,31: 2001. <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/Resources/ANC.htm>.

Media

The Chronicle (Bulawayo).

Mmegi (Gaborone).

Mmegi-Monitor (Gaborone).

Botswana Guardian (Gaborone).

Mid-week Sun (Gaborone).

Botswana Gazette (Gaborone).

The Voice (Gaborone)

Botswana Daily News (Gaborone).